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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the welfare eﬀects of pollution abatement tech-
nology transfer in a two-good two-country model with transboundary pollution. In each
country, one industry emits pollution as a joint product of output and the sum of domes-
tic and cross-border pollution decreases productivity of the other industry. Then, we show
that technology transfer can beneﬁt the recipient country regardless of the level of cross-
border pollution. Moreover, the donor country gains from technology transfer if all pollution
is transboundary but it may harm the donor country without cross-border pollution. We
demonstrate that the eﬀects of technology transfer depend on the trade pattern as well as
cross-border pollution.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing concern with the eﬀects of economic development on
the global environment. For example, we are concerned that a recent increase in green-house
gases alters each country’s climate and the change may negatively aﬀect agricultural production
(e.g., OECD Environmental Outlook, 2001). We recognize that each country should introduce
environmental policy to resolve global environmental problems.
This paper examines the eﬀects of pollution abatement technology transfer in a two-good
two-country model. In each country, a dirty industry emits pollution as a joint product of output
and the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases productivity of a clean industry.
The basic structure of our model is based on Copeland and Taylor (1999), Benarroch and Thille
(2001), and Unteroberdoerster (2001). Their focus was on the impact of free trade and did
not analyze the eﬀects of technology transfer. The transfer of pollution abatement technology
is assumed to reduce the emission rate of pollution in a recipient country. The present paper
investigates the eﬀects of technology transfer on terms of trade and the amount of pollution.
We also explore how technology transfer aﬀects each country’s welfare and world welfare.
The analysis of pollution abatement technology transfer is important in the following sense.
In many countries, especially in developing countries, the government has diﬃculty in taking
positive measures to deal with environmental degradation because of the lack of funds and
pollution abatement technology for preservation and clean-up. Thus, the transfer of pollution
abatement technology transfer may be a possible resolution to global environmental problems.
Moreover, the third Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (COP3) held in Kyoto in 1997 adopted, so-called, the Kyoto Protocol. The
2protocol includes an important agreement that the targets of reduction in green-house gases
(GHGs) in developed countries were explicitly set. The Kyoto Protocol introduces the so-
called ‘Kyoto mechanisms’ as an international system to promote to achieve such commitments.
One of the important Kyoto mechanisms is a clean development mechanism (CDM). It allows
developed countries (Annex I Party) to acquire from developing countries (non-Annex I Party),
as “certiﬁed reduction emissions”, the emissions reduction resulting from emissions reduction
projects in the developing countries.1 Pollution abatement technology transfer is considered as
one of the important measures to utilize CDM.
We derive the following results. First, we show that the transfer of pollution abatement
technology increases the price of the polluting good. Second, under no transboundary pollu-
tion, technology transfer increases the domestic pollution in the donor country. If all pollution
is transboudary, then technology transfer reduces the amount of pollution aﬀecting the donor
country under certain conditions. On the other hand, in the recipient country, technology trans-
fer decreases the amount of pollution aﬀecting the recipient country under certain conditions
regardless of the level of transboundary pollution. Third, under no transboundary pollution,
technology transfer harms the donor country if the donor country imports the polluting good
but the donor country beneﬁts from technology transfer if the donor country exports the pol-
luting good and does not emit pollution. On the other hand, under the presence of cross-border
pollution, technology transfer can harm or enrich the donor country depending on the trade pat-
tern. Forth, technology transfer enriches the recipient country if the recipient country exports
the polluting good regardless of the fraction of transboudary pollution but technology transfer
1If emissions reduction projects are implemented between the developed countries, it is called Joint Implemen-
tation (JI) instead of CDM. The Kyoto Protocol permits JI as one of the Kyoto mechanisms.
3may harm the recipient country if the recipient country imports the polluting good. Finally, we
demonstrate the suﬃcient conditions for Pareto improvement.
There has been a few studies on the eﬀects of technology transfer on the environment.
Buchholz and Konrad (1994) and Stranlund (1996) examined the global environmental problem
by using a game-theoretic approach. They used a one-good model because their focus was on
the strategic behavior of countries toward pollution abatement technology. Then, they cannot
deal with the terms-of-trade eﬀect on pollution which works in the present model. In other
words, a one-good model cannot investigate the inter-industry interaction caused by pollution.
Thus, a change in pollution might be underestimated in their model.
There exist sharp diﬀerences on the welfare eﬀects of technology transfer between Itoh and
Tawada (2003) and the present paper although the basic structure of both models is based on
Copeland and Taylor (1999) and technology transfer is the same type (i.e., technology transfer
reduces the emission rate in the recipient country). Under local pollution, technology transfer
never beneﬁts the donor country in their model but technology transfer can enrich the donor
country in the present model. More importantly, under cross-border pollution, Itoh and Tawada
(2003) demonstrated that both the donor and the recipient is better oﬀ by the pollution abate-
ment technology transfer but we derive that technology transfer may impoverish the recipient
country as well as the donor country.
We explain that such contradiction arises because of diﬀerences in the terms-of-trade eﬀect
and international interaction caused by transboundary pollution. Since the trade pattern in each
country is determined by the assumption on pollution in Itoh and Tawada (2003), they cannot
deal with some trade patterns which can be examined in this paper. In the present model, the
terms-of-trade eﬀect has impact opposite to their model. Since their analysis is limited to special
4trade patterns, they may have overestimated the terms-of-trade eﬀect. International interaction
caused by transboundary pollution is also important. In this paper, both the donor and the
recipient produce the clean good and the polluting good. Then, there are interactions not
only between the industries due to pollution externality but also between the countries through
cross-border pollution. On the other hand, in Itoh and Tawada (2003), at least one of the donor
and the recipient completely specializes because their model behaves like the Ricardian model.
Because of this feature, pollution abatement technology transfer has no international interaction
which works in the present model. Hence, they may have underestimated the impact of cross-
border pollution. We show the conditions for welfare improvement by technology transfer in a
model with incomplete specialization. This paper adds a new value to this ﬁeld of research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We develop a model in Section 2. We
examine the eﬀects of technology transfer on terms of trade and pollution in Section 3. Section
4 explores the welfare eﬀects of technology transfer. Finally, we provide concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We develop a two-country general equilibrium model to investigate the welfare eﬀects of the
transfer of pollution abatement technology under cross-border pollution. Country α is the
donor and country β is the recipient. In each country, there are two industries denoted M
and A. Industry M is a dirty industry that emits pollution as a joint product of output.
Pollution generated by industry M degrades the natural environment useful to industry A and
then decreases productivity of industry A. The markets of goods and factors of production are
competitive in both countries. All goods are assumed to be produced in both countries.





M is the vector of factors employed in industry M. Fα
M(·) is increasing, concave,
and linearly homogeneous in inputs. We assume that one unit of M generates λα units of
pollution. It denotes the degree of dirtiness of the industry. The level of pollution, dα, caused
by the domestic output of M is given by dα = λαQα
M.
Under the presence of transboundary pollution, the total level of pollution, Dα, aﬀecting the
donor country is given by
Dα = dα + bαdβ, (1)
where dβ = λβQ
β
M is the level of pollution caused by the domestic output of M in the recipient
country and the parameter, bα, indicates the fraction of transboundary pollution aﬀecting the
donor country (0 ≤ bα ≤ 1). With bα = 0, there is no cross-border pollution, whereas with
bα = 1 all pollution is transboundary.





the vector of factors used in industry A. Fα
A(·) is increasing, concave, and linearly homogeneous
in inputs. mα = mα(Dα) is the degree of pollution externality (0 <m α(Dα) ≤ 1 and mα (Dα) <
0). We assume that a representative ﬁrm in industry A treats the amount of pollution, Dα,a s
exogenously given.
We deﬁne the gross domestic product (GDP) function as follows:








A = vα}, (2)
where p and vα denote the world relative price of M and the factor endowment vector of the
donor country, respectively. It is linearly homogeneous in p and mα (e.g., Helpman, 1984, p.334).
2The production structure of the recipient country is similar to that of the donor country. In this paper, we
allow diﬀerences in production technologies and preferences between the donor and the recipient.
6Let us deﬁne the following function:








A = vα}, (3)
where qα ≡
p
mα(Dα). The value of  Rα(·) is the ‘virtual’ national income of the donor country
since it denotes the national income under no production externality and the ‘virtual’ price,
qα. We deﬁne the ‘virtual’ national income and price to describe equilibrium by utilizing the
traditional GDP function.  Rα(·) behaves like the standard GDP function with constant returns
to scale technologies.
By using the virtual national income, we can rewrite the GDP function as  Gα(p,mα,vα)=
mα(Dα) Rα(qα,vα). It has the following property:  Gα
p =  Rα
q = Qα
M where a subscript indi-




∂p (see Appendix A). Henceforth, we delete the ﬁxed
factor endowment vector, i.e., Gα(p,mα) ≡  Gα(p,mα,vα) and Rα(qα) ≡  Rα(qα,vα). Then,
Gα(p,mα)=mα(Dα)Rα(qα). We should notice that the GDP function, Gα(p,mα), includes
information of pollution externality.












q (qα) − Rβ
q(qβ)=0 , (8)
3The equilibrium in our model essentially replicates the steady state in Copeland and Taylor (1999) and
Unteroberdoerster (2001) that modeled pollution as a stock in a dynamic model.
7where Ej(p,uj) is the expenditure function with the level of utility, uj (j = α,β). Equations
(4) and (6) are the budget constraint of the donor and the recipient, respectively. Equations (5)
and (7) indicate the endogenous level of pollution (i.e., domestic pollution plus transboundary
pollution) in the donor and the recipient, respectively. Equation (8) is the market-clearing
condition for the polluting good, M. The world market for A also clears by Walras’ Law.
3 Terms of Trade and Global Pollution
In this section, we investigate the impact of pollution abatement technology transfer on terms of
trade and pollution. They are essential to the welfare eﬀects of technology transfer. If the donor
country transfers pollution abatement technology to the recipient country, then the emission
rate of the recipient country, λβ, decreases. We assume that pollution abatement technology is
transferred without cost in order to highlight the impact of technology transfer. All goods are
assumed to be normal in consumption in both countries, i.e., pEα
pu > 0 and pE
β
pu > 0.
First, we consider changes in the terms of trade. Totally diﬀerentiating equations (4)-(8)
and choosing E
j





























where b ≡ bα = bβ.4 ∆ represents the Jacobian determinant of the system (4)-(8). Under
certain conditions on the interaction between the emission rate and pollution, ∆ is positive if
the equilibrium is Walrasian stable (see Appendix B). We assume ∆ > 0 throughout this paper.
Equation (9) shows that pollution abatement technology transfer unambiguously increases
the price of the polluting good. Note that this eﬀect of technology transfer is independent of the
4The essence of our results remains valid even if we assume b
α = b
β.













mj (i  = j) is positive. Then, 1+(1−b2)
λαRα
qqpmα 
(mα)2 > 0 because
1−b2 is smaller than one. We can rewrite rα and rβ as rα = −
Qα
Amα 







q − mjRj = −Q
j
A < 0. Hence, the right hand side of equation (9) is
negative. We derive this result regardless of the fraction of transboundary pollution.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The transfer of pollution abatement technology increases the price of the pol-
luting good.
Technology transfer increases the price of the polluting good under incomplete specialization
in both countries. On the other hand, if the recipient country produces the clean good only
(i.e., R
β
q = 0), technology transfer is meaningless and the price of the polluting good does not
change. This paper extends the result of the terms-of-trade eﬀect in Itoh and Tawada (2003) in
which at least one country completely specializes.
Second, we examine the eﬀects of technology transfer on pollution aﬀecting each country.
Intuitively, we expect that a decrease in the emission rate in country β reduces the amount of
pollution in both countries if pollution is transboundary. However, technology transfer does not
always have such impact.






































(M1 − bM2), (11)

















mβ < 0. From Appendix




From equation (10), the impact of pollution abatement technology transfer on Dα is ambigu-
ous in general. We will consider two cases according to the fraction of cross-border pollution.
Under no transboundary pollution, b = 0, technology transfer unambiguously increases pollu-
tion in the donor country. Recall that the price of the polluting good increases after technology
transfer. The output of the polluting good increases and therefore pollution expands in the
donor country. Technology transfer deteriorates the natural environment useful to the clean
good in the donor country under the absence of transboundary pollution.
Suppose that all pollution is transboudary, b = 1. Then, M1−bM2 = 0. Technology transfer
reduces the amount of pollution aﬀecting the donor country if Z<0.5 Z is negative if either
of the following conditions is satisﬁed: (i) the equilibrium without pollution externality (i.e.,
b =0 ,λα = λβ = 0, and mα = mβ = 1) is Walrasian stable; (ii) the recipient country imports
(exports) the polluting good and the marginal propensity to consume it in the recipient country








We can explain the intuition of this result as follows. Technology transfer directly reduces
transboundary pollution from the recipient to the donor under the ﬁxed output of the polluting
good in the recipient. On the other hand, since technology transfer increases the price of the
polluting good (Proposition 1), it indirectly has a negative impact on the environment in the
donor country through an increase in the output of the polluting good in both countries. How-
ever, the former impact of cross-border pollution dominates the later eﬀect when all pollution is
5We can derive a similar result if we assume λ
α = 0 instead of b =1 .
6Since there are diﬀerences in the emission rate, production technologies, and preference between the donor
and the recipient, various trade patterns can take place in the present model.
10transboundary. Hence, pollution abatement technology transfer can improve the environment if
transboundary pollution is suﬃciently large.
From equation (11), technology transfer decreases the amount of pollution aﬀecting the
recipient country under Z<0. Notice that this result holds with and without transboundary
pollution. The reasoning is similar to the case of the donor country. The transfer of pollution
abatement technology can lower the amount of pollution although the price of the polluting
good increases after the transfer.
Summing up, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Technology transfer changes the amount of pollution aﬀecting the donor coun-
try and the recipient country as follows. (i) The case of the donor country: (a) under no
transboundary pollution, technology transfer increases the domestic pollution; (b) if all pollution
is transboudary, then technology transfer reduces the amount of pollution aﬀecting the donor
country under Z<0. (ii) The case of the recipient country: technology transfer decreases
the amount of pollution aﬀecting the recipient country under Z<0 regardless of the level of
transboundary pollution.
We show that pollution abatement technology transfer may paradoxically increase the amount
of pollution. On the contrary, in Itoh and Tawada (2003), pollution abatement technology trans-
fer will reduce pollution. We can explain why such contradiction occurs as follows. In their
model, preference is assumed to be identical between the donor and the recipient. This implies
Z<0 because of Eα
pu = E
β
pu. From Proposition 2, technology transfer decreases pollution
aﬀecting each country except case (i)-(a).
The exception occurs because of the diﬀerence in production pattern. In Itoh and Tawada
11(2003), there are two production patterns in the recipient country under local pollution: (i) com-
plete specialization in the polluting good; (ii) incomplete specialization. Under local pollution,
pollution in the donor country can increase if the domestic output of the polluting good increases
through a price change. Since the recipient country completely specializes in the polluting good
in the former case, improvement in the environment by technology transfer has no eﬀect on the
supply of the clean good. Namely, there is no terms-of-trade eﬀect. Therefore, the domestic
pollution in the donor country never changes. In the latter case, the donor country produces
the clean good only. Thus, there is no pollution emission in the donor country. Since Itoh and
Tawada (2003) examined technology transfer in the context of special production patterns, they
may have overestimated the reduction of pollution by technology transfer.
Finally, we examine changes in the sum of pollution aﬀecting the donor and the recipient
(global pollution), i.e., Dα + Dβ =( 1+b)(dα + dβ). In other words, how technology transfer
changes the sum of each country’s emission, dα + dβ (because b is assumed to be constant in






























This analysis has important implication for resolution of the global warming problem by
utilizing CDM. In the present model, we can interpret pollution as GHGs. The donor country has
an incentive to transfer pollution abatement technology to acquire “certiﬁed reduction emissions”
if the transfer can decrease the sum of each country’s emission. It is straightforward from
Proposition 2 that technology transfer necessarily decreases the sum of each country’s pollution
(dα + dβ) if all pollution is transboundary (b = 1) and Z<0. On the other hand, from
12Proposition 2, under b = 0 and Z<0, technology transfer increases the domestic pollution in
the donor country whereas it lowers that in the recipient country. It is not clear that technology
transfer reduces the sum of the two countries’ pollution. Thus, we can conclude that an incentive
for technology transfer depends on the degree of cross-border pollution.
Using a game-theoretic approach, Buchholz and Konrad (1994) and Stranlund (1996) ex-
amined the global environmental problem. Since their focus was on the strategic behavior of
countries toward pollution abatement technology, they used a one-good model. Therefore, they
cannot deal with the terms-of-trade eﬀect on pollution. A change in pollution might be un-
derestimated in their model. Itoh and Tawada (2003) did not clarify how the global pollution
changes as a result of technology transfer.
4 Welfare Eﬀects of Technology Transfer
4.1 The donor country
We examine the welfare eﬀect of pollution abatement technology transfer in the donor country.















































It is convenient for considering two cases according to the fraction of cross-border pollution.



























We show that the donor country suﬀers from technology transfer when it imports the polluting
good (Eα
p −Rα
q ≥ 0).7 On the other hand, the eﬀect of pollution abatement technology transfer
is ambiguous if the donor country exports the polluting good (Eα
p − Rα
q < 0). Especially,
technology transfer enriches the donor country if there is no domestic pollution in the donor
country (λα = 0). We derive Dα =0 ,mα = 0, and mα  =0i fλα = 0. Then, the right hand
side of equation (14) is negative.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there is no transboundary pollution. Then, (i) technology transfer
harms the donor country if the donor country imports the polluting good but (ii) the donor country
beneﬁts from technology transfer if the donor country exports the polluting good and does not
emit pollution.
The result can be explained as follows. Technology transfer increases the relative price of the
polluting good (Proposition 1). Moreover, technology transfer increases the domestic pollution
in the donor country (Proposition 2), which will cause productivity losses. Both the former and
the latter eﬀects deteriorates welfare because the price change is deterioration in terms of trade
under Eα
p − Rα
q ≥ 0. On the other hand, in the case of Eα
p − Rα
q < 0, the price change implies
improvement in terms of trade. The smaller λα is the smaller productivity losses are. Then, the
terms-of-trade eﬀect can outweigh productivity losses if λα is near zero.
7Recall that the recipient country is assumed to produce the polluting good (R
β
q > 0). Otherwise, technology
transfer has no eﬀect on welfare.
14Second, we investigate the case of cross-border pollution (b>0). From equation (13), the
welfare eﬀect of technology transfer is ambiguous in general. Consider the case in which the
donor imports the polluting good (Eα
p −Rα
q ≥ 0). Then, technology transfer can harm the donor
country if the fraction of transboundary pollution, b, is suﬃciently small. The right hand side
of equation (13) can be positive under suﬃciently small b.
On the other hand, we consider the case in which the donor country exports the polluting
good (Eα
p − Rα
q < 0). Then, the donor country beneﬁts from technology transfer if all pollution
is transboundary (b = 1) or the donor country does not emit pollution (λα = 0). The signs of
the ﬁrst and the last two terms of equation (13) are negative. In the second term, we already
know that M1 −bM2 is zero under b =1o rλα = 0. Hence, the right hand side of equation (13)
is negative.
Summing up, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there is cross-border pollution. Then, (i) in the case in which the
donor country imports the polluting good, technology transfer can harm the donor country if the
fraction of transboundary pollution between the countries is suﬃciently small. (ii) In the case
in which the donor country exports the polluting good, technology transfer enriches the donor
country if (a) all pollution is transboundary or (b) the donor country does not emit pollution.
Intuition of the result is the following. A decrease in pollution aﬀecting the donor country is
likely to be small under small b (Proposition 2). The donor country enjoys small productivity
gains. When the donor country imports the polluting good, terms of trade deteriorates in the
donor country (Proposition 1). The latter eﬀect can outweigh the former eﬀect. Thus, the donor
country can suﬀer from technology transfer even if pollution decreases. On the other hand, a
15decrease in pollution aﬀecting the donor is large when (a) b = 1. The price change is in favor of
the donor country when it exports the polluting good. Thus, the donor country beneﬁts from
technology transfer. Under (b) λα = 0, a decrease in transboundary pollution from the recipient
and improvement in terms of trade determine the welfare result.
4.2 The recipient country






























































We will consider two cases according to the trade pattern in order to clarify the impact of
technology transfer.









q ≤ 0, the right hand side of equation (15) is negative. Thus, the
recipient country unambiguously beneﬁts from technology transfer. Notice that we derive this
result regardless of the fraction of transboudary pollution, b.






























































The welfare eﬀect of technology transfer is ambiguous in general. Technology transfer can enrich
or harm the recipient country. We know that the third and the forth terms in the right hand
side are positive but the other terms are negative. Then, the right hand side of equation (16)
may be positive.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Technology transfer enriches the recipient country if the recipient country ex-
ports the polluting good but technology transfer may harm the recipient country if the recipient
country imports the polluting good, regardless of the fraction of transboudary pollution.
We can explain the intuition of the result as follows. In the case in which the recipient
country exports the polluting good, the terms-of-trade eﬀect is in favor of the recipient country
(Proposition 1). Moreover, technology transfer decreases pollution under certain conditions but
it may increase pollution if the conditions are not satisﬁed (Proposition 2). The recipient country
may suﬀer from productivity losses. The former terms-of-trade eﬀect dominates the latter eﬀect,
which holds regardless of the fraction of transboundary pollution. Hence, the recipient country
beneﬁts from technology transfer. On the other hand, the terms of trade deteriorates after
technology transfer if the recipient country imports the polluting good. In this case, welfare
enrichment arises if productivity gains outweigh the terms-of-trade eﬀect.
Finally, let us investigate a possibility of voluntary reduction in the emission rate instead of
technology transfer. This analysis can be done by interpreting the welfare result of the recipient
in a diﬀerent way. From Proposition 5, a country is likely to adopt advanced pollution abatement
17technology to reduce pollution if it exports the polluting good. On the other hand, a country
may not voluntarily utilize the advanced technology if it imports the polluting good. The result
is dependent on the trade pattern. The reason is the terms-of-trade eﬀect which has impact
similar to the case of technology transfer. Our result implies that a country which produces
a large amount of the polluting good to export it tends to introduce the pollution-reducing
technology voluntarily.
4.3 The world welfare
We investigate the eﬀect of technology transfer on the world welfare, i.e., the sum of the two























































It is convenient for considering two cases according to the fraction of cross-border pollution and
the emission rate.
First, we examine the case in which all pollution is transboundary (b = 1). Technology
transfer improves the world welfare if the donor country imports the polluting good (Eα
p −
Rα
q > 0) and the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is






pu in the third right hand side term is negative if Eα
pu is suﬃciently larger
than E
β
pu. Thus, the right hand side of equation (17) is negative under the conditions.






pu < 0). From Proposition 2, technology transfer reduces the amount of pollution
aﬀecting each country. Then, there are productivity gains in both countries. From Proposition
5, the recipient country beneﬁts from technology transfer. The welfare of the donor country
may improve or deteriorate by technology transfer (Proposition 4). The welfare improvement in
the recipient can outweigh the welfare change in the donor under the conditions.
Second, we explore the case in which the donor country does not emit pollution (λα = 0).
Technology transfer improves the world welfare if the donor country imports the polluting good
(Eα
p −Rα
q > 0) and the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country





pu < 0). Recall
that M1 − bM2 = 0 under λα = 0. Then, the right hand side of equation (17) is negative under
the conditions. The reason is similar to the above case.
Summing up, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the donor country imports the polluting good and the marginal
propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is suﬃciently larger than that in
the recipient country. Then, technology transfer improves the world welfare if (i) all pollution is
transboundary or (ii) the donor country does not emit pollution.
We will compare the results of this paper with the existing literature. There exist sharp
diﬀerences on the welfare eﬀects of technology transfer between Itoh and Tawada (2003) and
the present paper although the basic structure of both models is based on Copeland and Taylor
(1999) and technology transfer is the same type (i.e., technology transfer reduces the emission
rate in the recipient country). Under local pollution, technology transfer has no impact on the
19welfare of the recipient country and never beneﬁts the donor country in their model but tech-
nology transfer can enrich the donor country and may harm the recipient country in the present
model. More importantly, under cross-border pollution, Itoh and Tawada (2003) demonstrated
that both the donor and the recipient can be better oﬀ by the pollution abatement technol-
ogy transfer and technology transfer never harms the donor country and the recipient country.
However, we derive that technology transfer may impoverish the recipient country as well as
the donor country. These diﬀerences imply that they may have underestimated the eﬀects of
technology transfer.
We can consider that such inconsistency arises because of three factors. The ﬁrst factor is
asymmetry of the present model. Itoh and Tawada (2003) assumed that the donor country is
identical to the recipient country except for the pollution function. The emission rate in the
recipient is assumed to be larger than that in the donor. On the other hand, in the present
model, the donor and the recipient are asymmetric. This causes the following essential factors.
The second factor is diﬀerences in the terms-of-trade eﬀect. Since the trade pattern in each
country is determined by the assumption on pollution in Itoh and Tawada (2003), they cannot
deal with trade patterns such as (ii) in Proposition 3, (i) in Proposition 4, and Proposition
5. For example, under the presence of transboundary pollution, the donor country exports the
polluting good because it has a comparative advantage in the production of the polluting good
in their framework. Then, the terms-of-trade eﬀect caused by technology transfer is in favor of
the donor country. On the contrary, the present model can examine not only the case in their
model but also the case in which the donor country imports the polluting good. In the latter
case, the terms-of-trade eﬀect has impact opposite to their model. The terms-of-trade eﬀect may
oﬀset productivity gains, which never occurs in their model. Since their analysis was limited to
20special trade patterns, they were unable to estimate the terms-of-trade eﬀect appropriately.
The third factor is international interaction caused by transboundary pollution. In this
paper, both the donor and the recipient produce the clean good and the polluting good. Then,
there are interactions not only between the industries due to pollution externality but also
between the countries through cross-border pollution. On the other hand, in Itoh and Tawada
(2003), at least one of the donor and the recipient completely specializes because their model
behaves like the Ricardian model. Because of this feature, pollution abatement technology
transfer has no international interaction which works in the present model. For example, in Itoh
and Tawada (2003) under cross-border pollution, the recipient country produces the polluting
good only if the donor country completely specializes in the polluting good. Although technology
transfer reduces the amount of pollution generated in the recipient country, the donor country
is not aﬀected by cross-border pollution. Hence, they may have underestimated the impact of
cross-border pollution.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the eﬀects of pollution abatement technology transfer in a two-good two-
country model. In each country, a dirty industry emits pollution as a joint product of output and
the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases productivity of a clean industry. The
transfer of pollution abatement technology reduces the emission rate of pollution in a recipient
country. The present paper investigates the eﬀects of technology transfer on terms of trade and
the amount of pollution aﬀecting each country. We also explore how technology transfer aﬀects
each country’s welfare and world welfare.
21In the present model, we demonstrate that technology transfer is not always welfare improv-
ing for the donor and the recipient even if pollution is transboundary. On the contrary, Itoh
and Tawada (2003) showed that both the donor and the recipient are better oﬀ by the pollution
abatement technology transfer if pollution in one of the two countries is global but welfare of
the donor country may fall if pollution in each country is local. Although the basic structure of
both models is based on Copeland and Taylor (1999) and technology transfer is the same type
(i.e., technology transfer reduces the emission rate in the recipient country), there are such sharp
diﬀerences. Both countries produce the polluting good and the clean good in the present model.
However, in Itoh and Tawada (2003), at least one country completely specializes. This diﬀerence
in production causes such inconsistency. This paper, together with Itoh and Tawada (2003),
implies that technology transfer is eﬀective to solve global environmental problems depending
on the production pattern.
We show a possibility of voluntary introduction of pollution abatement technology. A country
is likely to adopt advanced pollution abatement technology to reduce pollution if it exports the
polluting good. The reason is that introduction of the advanced technology improves terms
of trade. This theoretical result implies that a country which produces a large amount of the
polluting good to export it, which may be a developed country, tends to introduce the pollution-
reducing technology voluntarily.
This paper focuses on the inter-industry and international interaction caused by pollution.
We may obtain general results if we describe the cost function of technology transfer explicitly.
One possible extension is to develop a new model to consider the strategic behavior of countries
toward pollution abatement technology.
22Appendix A
In this Appendix, we consider the relationship between  Gα(p,mα,vα) and  Rα(qα,vα). Since the
GDP function,  Gα(·), is linearly homogeneous in p and mα, it can be rewritten as follows:























From the properties of the GDP function, we have  Gα
p = Qα
M (e.g., Helpman, 1984). Thus,
we derive  Gα
p = mα  Rα
q
∂qα




In this Appendix, we consider the sign of the Jacobian determinant of the system (4)-(8), ∆,
and its implications. Totally diﬀerentiating equations (4)-(8) and choosing E
j



















































































mβ < 0, rα ≡ (pRα
q − mαRα)mα 
mα , and rβ ≡ (pR
β
q − mβRβ)mβ 
mβ .







q(qβ). Linearizing the system at the equilibrium values of the variables,













Let us examine the sign of J. Using equation (5), we can rewrite the second term of J as
λαRα
qqpmα 













We deﬁne  α





D ≡ Dα mα 
mα .  α
q and  α
D indicate the virtual price elasticity of output



































D ≡ Dβ mβ 
mβ .
From equations (A.1) and (A.2), J can be rewritten as
J =1 +  α
q α


































This assumption implies that the absolute values of the elasticities are not so large and either the
absolute value of  
j
q or  
j
D is smaller than unity. Hence, we obtain J>0. Since ˙ p =( −∆J−1)dp,
∆ is positive if the equilibrium is locally Walrasian stable.
Finally, we consider the implications of the positive sign of J. From equations (5) and (7),





q J−1. Thus, J>0
under b>0 denotes that an increase of the emission rate in one country, λj, results in an
24increase of pollution in the other country, Di (i  = j). Especially, J>0 under b = 1 also
implies ∂Dα
∂λα = Rα
q J−1 > 0 and ∂Dβ
∂λβ = R
β
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